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Populism and the Affective Politics of Humiliation Narratives1 
 
Alexandra Homolar & Georg Löfflmann  
 





This article examines how communicative practices, emotion, and everyday experiences of 
insecurity interlink in processes of populist political mobilization. Combining insights from 
international security studies, political psychology, and populism research, it demonstrates 
how populist political agents from the right of the political spectrum have constructed a 
powerful security imaginary around the loss of past national greatness which creates 
affinities with the experiences of those who feel disempowered and ties existential anxieties 
to concerns with immigration, globalization, and integration. As we show, within the 
populist security imaginary, humiliation is the key discursive mechanism that helps turn 
abstract notions of enmity into politically consequential affective narratives of loss, 
betrayal, and oppression. Humiliation binds together an ostensibly conflicting sense of 
national greatness and victimhood to achieve an emotive response that enables a radical 
departure from established domestic and international policy norms and problematizes 
policy choices centred on collaboration, dialogue, and peaceful conflict resolution.  
 





On Election Day, the politicians stand trial before the people….  the American people 
will have a chance to issue a verdict on the politicians that have sacrificed their 
security, betrayed their prosperity, and sold out their country. 
Donald Trump, 22 June 20162 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Populist political agents from the right of the political spectrum tell visceral stories of 
insecurity – from countries overrun by criminal migrants to warnings of impending economic 
collapse and terminal national decline – that frame the fears and grievances of ‘the people’ as 
being systematically ignored and marginalized by a corrupt ‘establishment’. Much of the appeal 
of this antagonist logic of populism has been associated with the wedding of ‘antielite and 
antiestablishment discursive appeals to the political mobilization of the excluded and the 
alienated’ (Roberts 2015: 142). Populists address feelings of resentment and loss of status 
(Marchlewska et al. 2017) that are shared by their voters (Jardina 2019; Norris and Ingelhart 
2019). That populist political agents would also use, as a core component of their security 
imaginary, a narrative that portrays the abandoned ‘true people’ as being humiliated is 
                                               
1 Research for this article has been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC grant number 
ES/K008684/1) and the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2017-545). We thank the three anonymous reviewers for their 
insightful comments.  
2 Here only referenced with date and location, Trump’s speeches are accessible at the American Presidency 
Project, from where they were retrieved for this study: 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/people/president/donald-j-trump  
 2 
counterintuitive. Although populism is associated with preferences for strong, tough, 
masculine, and hierarchical leadership styles and psychological predispositions that display 
disdain for inferiority (Pettigrew 2017), this article shows that the affective politics of 
humiliation is a key feature of the populist security imaginary. Moving towards a ‘post-
dualistic’ understanding of mobilizing affects (Leser and Spissinger 2020), it builds on the 
assumption that cognition and rational thinking are insufficient to understand political 
behaviour: populist security rhetoric has traction because of the emotion-inducing repertoires 
used to tell a story rather than through any measurable or objective ‘truth’ contained in it. 
Situated broadly within research that treats populism as a ‘rhetorical style’ (Canovan 1981), a 
‘flexible mode of persuasion’ (Kazin 1995), and a ‘populist discourse’ (Hawkins et al. 2012; 
2019), our narrative inquiry into humiliation discourse adopts a vernacular security studies 
perspective that sits at the intersection of political psychology and populism research. While 
substantial conceptual differences exist between these distinct literatures, they share an 
overriding concern with the political significance of non-elite perspectives, vernacular rhetoric, 
and everyday experiences of insecurity and provide a useful entry point into understanding 
how the humiliation-centric rhetorical choices made by populist political agents are affective 
articulations of belonging and exclusion that tap into everyday insecurities. As we shall see, it 
is through a focus on the nexus between the security imaginary, vernacular blame attribution, 
and everyday emotions, that populist humiliation narratives emerge as affective devices that 
harness a cluster of ordinary emotional responses. 
The role of emotions in the study of populist discourse has been recognized as an important 
area of narrative inquiry. Thus far, however, populism has predominantly been viewed as a 
domestic political issue (de la Torre 2015; Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; 
Roberts 2006) with an emphasis on quantitative discourse analysis (Jagers and Walgrave 
2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Interaction between populism research and International 
Relations has been limited and focused predominantly on the linkages between populism and 
foreign policy (Chryssogelos 2017; Plagemann and Destradi 2018; Verbeek and Zaslove 2017).3 
While little cross-fertilization has taken place between populism research and adjacent fields 
in the study of security and international dynamics (Steele and Homolar 2019, Löfflmann 
2019), we seek to make the case for expanding research into systematically identifying populist 
emotion appeals. Through a multi-disciplinary lens, we show how humiliation narratives 
provide the affective fuel that enables a radical departure from established domestic and 
international policy norms and problematizes policy choices centred on collaboration, 
dialogue, and peaceful conflict resolution. 
By locating much of the ‘discursive force’ (Solomon 2017) and ‘mobilizing potential’ (Van 
Rythoven 2018) that underpins the populist security imaginary in the affective work 
humiliation does, the article complements the rapidly expanding scholarship in International 
Relations that explores how emotions are implicated in building, sustaining, limiting, and 
regulating communities (Koschut 2019; Hutchison 2016; Fierke 2013; Widmaier 2009), the 
emotional politics of conflict and violence (Åhäll and Gregory 2015; Crawford 2014; Wilcox 
2015; Ross 2014), and the link between affect and discourse (Koschut et al. 2017; Bially 
Mattern 2011; Edkins 2003; Van Rythoven 2015). Rather than studying the representation, 
communication, and reception of emotions (Koshut 2017; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008), 
however, we explore how message components within populist security discourse carry a 
cluster of complex ambivalent emotions, both positive and negative, through their emphasis 
on humiliating experiences (Brader 2005). While the act of humiliation is an exercise of power 
aimed at controlling and disempowering those at the receiving end, the experience of 
                                               
3 For recent exceptions see, e.g., Destradi and Plagemann 2019; Stengel et al. 2019.  
 3 
humiliation is widely linked to emotions such as shame and dishonour that are entwined with 
the lowering of status and respect (Saurette 2006; Fattah and Fierke 2009). This article shows 
that a humiliation-centric discourse can empower populist political agents to claim 
experiences of trauma and loss for their audiences, thus fueling rather than quenching their 
sense of entitlement and status. In the affective universe that populist agents create, 
humiliation becomes a form of abreaction that reclaims dignity by defiantly celebrating failure. 
It serves as a narrative device not only to express previously held emotions and grievances but 
also to release them.  
The article proceeds as follows. The first section substantiates the article’s underlying premise 
that combining research on populist discourse, insecurity, and the everyday is conceptually 
productive, especially in the context of understanding processes of affective political 
mobilization. The second section discusses how populist humiliation narratives conjure images 
of a glorious past to demean the present, fostering a fantasy of national greatness and 
belonging that is linked to shared feelings of resentment, pride, and nostalgia. The third section 
focuses on the creation of a sense of shared victimhood through populist humiliation narratives 
and how these interlink with horizontal and vertical blame-attribution. The final section 
explores how humiliation acts as an identity driver that fosters the creation of both ingroup 
solidarity and conflictual behaviour towards a broad range of undeserving Others. As such, the 
article moves beyond a focus on understanding negative emotions primarily as ‘phenomena to 
be managed’ towards something that political agents actively draw on (Hutchison and Bleiker 
2012: 156). The dyadic ability of humiliation narratives to affectively anchor populist 
messaging in feelings of pride and hope on the one hand, and anxiety and anger on the other 
underscores our main argument that, while emotions shape politics, politics also shapes and 
channels emotions.  
 
 
POPULISM AS PERFORMANCE OF THE SECURITY VERNACULAR  
The study of international security increasingly engages with everyday actions and actors, both 
conceptually and empirically, which had long been considered as trivial, mundane, and 
irrelevant in much of the discipline. In particular, work on ‘the unnoticed’ (Hviid Jacobsen 
2009: 2) has shifted attention away from states and powerful political agents in the 
construction of threats and security toward a multidimensional view of agency and the role of 
everyday actions and choices (Acuto 2014; Kessler and Guillaume 2012). Correspondingly, we 
find a growing concern with the political significance of ‘ordinary people’ in the social 
construction of threat and security (Stanley and Jackson 2016; Stevens and Vaughan-Williams 
2016). As Jarvis and Lister (2013: 158) suggest, the significance of a focus on the everyday lies 
in its opposition to elite articulations that ‘speak for, rather than to (or, perhaps better, with) 
“ordinary” people and the conditions of (in)security they experience, encounter or construct in 
everyday life’. However, despite this interest in vernacular insecurities and in how insecurity 
is felt and lived by non-elite communities (Bubandt 2005; Jarvis 2019), how populist political 
agents may hijack quotidian security constructions to mobilize support has received little 
attention within both mainstream and critical approaches to international security. 
Investigating this link between political mobilization and everyday insecurities is important to 
understand how the populist performance of the security vernacular valorizes ordinary people 
(Jansen 2011: 82) and relates otherwise abstract notions of enmity to people’s everyday social 
encounters.  
A series of public opinion survey studies has attested to the resonance of populist vernacular 
narratives of humiliation in Western societies, in particular among white working-class and 
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non-university educated voters, where they recorded widespread sentiments of anti-elite 
resentment, cultural anxiety, and concern over the loss of status and privilege (Akkerman et 
al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2012; Jardina 2019; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). For the 
United States, Hochschild’s (2016) ethnographic study of the American right identified a set of 
interlocking ‘deep stories’ of victimhood and alienation tied to perceptions of marginalisation, 
with people feeling like ‘strangers in their own land’. The French geographer Christophe Guilly 
(2019) similarly described a sense of displacement and disillusionment by a ‘peripheral 
France’, whose population of small towns and villages felt both economically threatened and 
culturally alienated by the forces of globalization and ignored by the French government, 
business, and media elite. For the United Kingdom, David Goodhart (2016) located a cultural 
division between cosmopolitan ‘anywheres’ and locally oriented ‘somewheres’ supporting 
Britain’s exit from the European Union (Brexit). Leave voters in rural areas and the North of 
England felt marginalized by a London establishment perceived as out of touch with their 
attitudes and values. These observations are frequently reproduced on the political level, with 
Barack Obama, for example, explaining the strong performance of Donald Trump in the 2020 
US presidential elections in terms of how the identity politics of the Republican Party have 
persistently reinforced a sense of victimhood among white men for electoral gain (Holpuch 
2020).  
While a detailed examination into the mechanisms of affective resonance lies beyond the scope 
of this article, an analytical focus on ontological security has provided a conceptual entry point 
into understanding how humiliation narratives target feelings of alienation, marginalization, 
and resentment to foster political support for populist electoral performances and policies 
(Steele and Homolar 2019: 215). As previous research has shown, populist discourses construct 
narratives of nostalgia (Browning 2019), historic continuity, and national belonging (Kinnvall 
2019; Suzuki 2019), and promote a sense of crisis that may tilt the electoral scales in favor of 
‘outsider’ populist candidates (Homolar and Scholz 2019). To shed light on the complex 
relationship between how security is understood and felt at the ‘bottom’ and how security 
encounters can be manipulated at the ‘top’ for political gain, we speak to such scholarship while 
also turning to insights from the broad disciplinary field of populism studies. Even within 
populism existing research, the concept of populism has been notoriously difficult to pin down. 
As Laclau (1977: 143) once observed, populism is notable for the absence of a precise definition, 
noting that ‘We know intuitively to what we are referring when we call a movement or an 
ideology populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in translating the intuition into concepts.’ 
The broad ideological, geographical, and historical spread of movements, parties, and 
individuals considered to fall under this category only adds to the contestation and 
fragmentation of the term (Taggart 2000; Laclau 2005; Canovan 1981).  
Much of contemporary populism research has moved away from considering populism as a 
fixed, coherent, and consistent ideological belief system. Rather, populism is understood as 
both a political discourse and a ‘thin-centred ideology’ that represents politics and society as 
structured by a fundamental antagonistic relationship between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ 
(Canovan 1999; Mudde 2007; De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017). In populism studies today, we 
can identify three main conceptual approaches associated with this discursive and stylistic turn 
(Brubaker 2017: 360): (1) the ideational approach, which understands populism largely as a 
Manichean ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ discourse pitting an idealized notion of the ‘true people’ against 
‘corrupt elites’ that betray them in the name of popular sovereignty (de la Torre 2015; Mudde 
2007); (2) the strategic approach, which zooms in on the political tactic used by populist 
leaders and self-identified establishment ‘outsiders’ to claim power in the ‘name of the people’ 
(Weyland 2017); and (3) the socio-cultural approach, which treats populism as a transgressive 
political style that disrupts conventional notions of ‘high politics’ and elite norms of behavior 
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through displays of ‘bad manners’ and ‘colorful and undiplomatic language’ (Canovan 2005: 
76; Ostiguy 2017; Moffitt 2016). The boundaries between these approaches are fluid, and they 
all share an emphasis on the role played by discursive tropes and styles.  
In this article, we treat populism as an adaptable discursive mode that is characterized by the 
populist assertion to speak and act for ‘the people’, as well as the claim to protect ‘the people’ 
as ‘first among equals’ (Homolar and Scholz 2019). Our interest does not lie in exploring how 
‘the people’ are constructed as idealized community – often on the basis of radical exclusion – 
and as the only legitimate carrier of popular sovereignty (Anderson 1983; Brubaker 2017: 362-
4; Canovan 1999: 5; Laclau 2005: 153; Wodak 2015; Mény and Surel 2002). Rather, building 
upon literature that has widely discussed the importance of language as a constitutive aspect 
of popular mobilization (Laclau 2005; Jansen 2011; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017) and 
scholarship on the role of affect in security politics (Hall and Ross 2019; Lynngaard 2019; Pace 
and Bilgic 2019), we explore the emotional appeal of the populist security imaginary (Rico et 
al. 2017; Samela and von Scheve 2017; Skonieczny 2018). In researching the affective politics 
of humiliation narratives, we focus explicitly on the establishment of a polarized discursive 
wedge between an in-group and out-groups (van Dijk 1995: 248-249) through a vernacular 
and frequently adversarial narrative style. While the discursive representation of value 
hierarchies and populist provocations of resentment that are directed at the elitist ‘top’ matter 
in our investigation, the less widely explored downward focus of the populist mobilization of 
complex affective clusters surrounding humiliation takes centre-stage (cf. Busher et al. 2018). 
Populist political agents act as ‘identity entrepreneurs’ (Reicher and Hopkins 2001) who frame 
undeserving Others as a threat to the nation's survival to justify ‘tough’ and ‘unflinching’ policy 
responses, which derive significant persuasive power ‘from their ability to redefine their 
follower's self-understanding’ (Mols and Jetten 2014: 83).  
Considering emotions as ‘affective energies’ (Ross, 2006: 212), the contribution of this article 
is primarily to expand our conceptual understanding of how populism works in practice.4 With 
a view to encouraging further empirical research into systematically identifying populist 
emotion appeals, we use illustrative examples of populist discursive patterns, primarily at the 
macro-level of text, rather than engaging in an empirical inquiry to demonstrate our 
conceptual points about the mobilizing effects of humiliation narratives. As we demonstrate, 
populist discourses construct their security imaginary of socio-economic threat, political 
alienation, and cultural anxiety decidedly as a non-elitist articulation of ordinary fears and 
concerns of the ‘people’ (Beeman 2018; Freeden 2017; Malik 2018). Stories shape our feelings 
toward others and ourselves, toward what is right and wrong, and toward what happens, when, 
and why (Capps and Ochs 1995: 53). Emotions make narratives meaningful and, as we show 
in this article, the populist performance of the security vernacular is no exception.  
 
 
THE HUMILIATING FANTASY OF GREATNESS 
 
  ‘The humiliation for our country never seems to end.’ 
   ‘Let’s not let our great country be laughed at anymore.’ 
                                               
4 It is important to note here that because the boundaries between them are both fuzzy and disputed, in this article 
we use emotion, feeling, and affect interchangeably while recognizing that they can be treated as distinct categories 
(Clément and Sangar 2018: 5; Hutchison 2016: 16; Crawford 2000: 125; Mercer 2014: 516). We understand under 
the umbrella terminology of emotions, the psychological phenomena that are experienced by individuals as 
‘embodied mental processes’ (Hall and Ross 2015) while being intimately related to social-cultural contexts (Ross 
2014; Ahmed 2004). 
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Donald Trump, US Presidential Campaign 2016 
 
Populist discourses reinforce a sense of existential insecurity in the everyday. To a significant 
extent, this is rooted in a general perception of disempowerment that originates in the loss of 
cultural identity, economic security, and political relevance (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Steele 
and Homolar 2019; Norris and Ingelhart 2019). Yet populist political agents frame the present 
not simply as being in a state of crisis; they generally do so with reference to a past of national 
greatness that the ‘true’ people have been cheated out of in the here and now, fueling fears over 
relative deprivation particularly in those who already hold a social dominance orientation and 
authoritarian values (Pratto and Shih 2000; Pettigrew 2017; Golec de Zavala et al. 2017). In 
the populist security imaginary, the myths of ‘Past triumphs rise up to humiliate the present 
self’ (Koestenbaum 2011: 4).  
Consider, for example, how Marine Le Pen, a top candidate in the 2017 French presidential 
election and leader of the National Front political party (now renamed as National Rally), 
described the international standing of the country in the summer of 2016. She characterized 
France as ‘an old and a great civilization’ in which the world had once seen ‘the symbol of the 
struggle against tyranny’ (Le Pen 2016). Today, Le Pen argued, ‘censors of greatness’, in an act 
of ‘self-hatred’, had actively stripped the country of this ‘national romance’, as she 
characterized France instead as a country defeated in war and ‘subjected to powers who defile 
its name’ (ibid.). While her supporters indeed displayed a strong tendency to see the country’s 
current state of affairs negatively, with nothing going well (Hillije 2018: 8), along with her 
campaign slogan Au nom du peuple (‘In the name of the people’), Le Pen promised to right this 
wrong and restore the country’s place in the world:  
‘France will be great again in the future, of that I am certain. And I will do all 
in my power to make this future day come as quickly as possible. Long live the 
Francophone world, long live French culture, long live the Republic, and long 
live France!’ (Le Pen 2016). 
The previous year, on the other side of the Atlantic, the TV personality and billionaire Donald 
Trump had publicly announced his candidacy for US President at Trump Tower in New York 
City on 22 June 2015, in front of what he falsely described as thousands of people, claiming 
that ‘There's been no crowd like this’. He began his announcement speech with the observation 
that the United States of America was ‘in serious trouble’, and that while ‘we used to have 
victories’, the America of today no longer had them. Because the American Dream was ‘dead’, 
Trump argued, a ‘cheerleader’ was needed to root for the country, ‘somebody that literally will 
take this country and make it great again’. He ended with the promise that if he was elected to 
serve as 45th President of the United States, he would bring back the country ‘bigger and better 
and stronger than ever before’. 
Both Le Pen and Trump echoed such affective appeals – of believing in the greatness of the 
country and restoring its rightful place and former glory – that had already featured 
prominently in the Brexit referendum campaign in the United Kingdom to leave the European 
Union. Conjuring the ‘vestiges of Empire’ (Dorling and Tomlinson 2019: 3), a past 
characterized by global reach, power, and influence when Britannia had ‘ruled the waves’, was 
a major narrative element in the Vote Leave campaign. Nigel Farage, then leader of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), for example, told his captive audience in Grimsby in May 2015 
that his party had faith ‘in a Britain that re-establishes itself across the world’. In bright letters, 
the stage-background shouted the campaign’s central motto: ‘Believe in Britain’ – a slogan 
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resurrected by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson (2020) in his attempt to rally support for his 
government’s widely criticized approach to tackling the Covid-19 pandemic.  
Despite their significantly different contexts, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and Donald 
Trump’s speeches all revolved around creating an image of their respective country’s past as 
something that is not only to be celebrated but also to be restored in the present. Although the 
contours remained remarkably vague and temporarily undescribed, in each case the country’s 
virtuous essence had been lost, and tragically so. The speeches thus exemplify narratives that 
stimulate two seemingly incompatible emotive responses – ‘a deep sense of grievance and a 
high sense of superiority’ (O’Toole 2018: 2-3) – a condition which Herbert Spencer (1876: 59) 
had explained long before the current resurgence of populist political agents in the West as: 
‘the contrast between his own worth as he estimates it and the treatment he has 
received… there is an idea of much withheld, and a feeling of implied superiority to 
those who withhold it.’ 
In populist humiliation discourse, the country of the present is described as a fundamentally 
weakened nation, systematically disadvantaged through ‘bad deals’ negotiated by the 
establishment and exploited by allies and enemies alike. Treasured pasts of national greatness 
are represented through romanticized images that reduce the present to a demeaning 
experience. Members of the target audience are constructed as an idealized community of 
shared origin and destiny, the ‘pure people’ (Mudde 2004: 543), who have been betrayed and 
humiliated because what is represented as their way of life and righteous place in the world 
has been lost. Glorious pasts rise up to serve as a benchmark to judge lived and felt experiences 
in the here and now and to provoke sentiments of unease over the fundamental state of being 
and feeling at ‘home’ in one’s country (Kinnvall 2004). 
At the same time, populist humiliation narratives are stories of relative deprivation that 
exacerbate a sense of collective privilege and victimization. They tend to discursively forge a 
link between highly stylized recollection of national heritage and what Volkan (1988) has 
defined as ‘chosen traumas’ – the selective remembrance of what is constructed as a 
persecutory event while ascribing to it an excessive amount of emotional and historic meaning. 
The historic references to the Second World War in the United Kingdom that are frequently 
evoked in debates over the future direction of British foreign and domestic policy serve to 
exemplify this. Brexit-supporting political agents have used this chosen trauma to frame 
resistance against the European Union as central to the restoration of British national 
sovereignty and fulfilment of the ‘will of the people’, and as a proud island nation’s heroic 
uprising against external tyranny. As Foreign Minister, for example, Boris Johnson 
constructed an analogy between European integration as institutionalized in the EU with past 
violent attempts to establish a pan-European hegemony by a single nation: ‘Napoleon, Hitler, 
various people tried this out, and it ends tragically. The EU is an attempt to do this by different 
methods’ (Johnson quoted in Walker 2019). The Conservative MP and member of the 
staunchly anti-EU European Research Group (ERG) in the House of Commons, Mark Francois, 
went a step further and put Adolf Hitler on par with the president of the European 
Commission, referring to Jean-Claude Juncker as ‘Herr Juncker in the bunker’ (quoted in 
Evans 2019). Historical images of tyranny are here summoned to define both insecurity and 
defiance in the present. 
In the United States, the Lost Cause of the Confederacy is a case in point. It is a revisionist 
narrative of the American Civil War that celebrates the antebellum South and sees the 
Confederate States merely as victims of Northern aggression, which gained renewed 
momentum as a traumatic moment in the country’s history under President Trump. In line 
with the myth of the Lost Cause, those supporting secession from the Union are seen not as 
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traitors but righteous nationalists, while the role slavery played is trivialized (Nolan 2000: 17), 
reminiscing a 19th century fantasy of white male dominance that was painfully lost. This was 
exemplified in the Charlottesville Unite the Right-rally in the Virginian town in August 2017, 
which culminated in the death of a protester from the ‘other’ side after a white nationalist 
ploughed his car into a crowd of counter-protesters. Triggered by the removal of a Confederate 
Monument, participants associated with white supremacism and far-right movements 
engaged in chants of ‘our blood, our soil’ and ‘You will not replace us’. Rally participants’ claims 
to victimhood and suffering were built around the loss and forced forgetting of ‘their’ white 
past, making them ‘strangers in their own land’ (Hochschild 2016), a sentiment reinforced by 
President Trump’s reaction to the violence in Charlottesville on 16 August 2017: 
‘this week, it is [taking down the statue of] Robert E. Lee. I noticed that Stonewall 
Jackson is coming down. I wonder, is it George Washington next week? And is it 
Thomas Jefferson the week after? You know, you really do have to ask yourself, 
where does it stop?’ 
 
Chosen traumas are powerful rhetorical tools because they foster identity building processes 
long after the represented traumatic event and spark ‘entitlement ideologies’ of restoration and 
revenge (Volkan and Fowler 2009: 214; see also Volkan 1988). Their emotive appeal is rooted 
in ‘eliciting culturally specific fears … to construct a plausible, yet anxiety inducing, future’ 
(Van Rythoven 2015: 466). The collective revelling in failure rather than sweeping it under the 
carpet in populist humiliation narratives is thus linked to processes of reclaiming self-worth 
(Golec de Zavala et al. 2009; Golec de Zavala et al. 2017). The explicit tension that emerges 
between past and present, which is integral to populist humiliation narratives, serves as a 
political tool that ‘weaponizes the emotion of nostalgia’ (Stanley 2018: 19-20), and aggravates 
‘postcolonial melancholia’ through assigning new political meaning to national myths and 
memories (Kinnvall 2018: 525). Here, emotive discursive anchoring here takes place through 
highly selective representations of the past in the present (Campbell 2020; Homolar and 
Rodriguez-Merino 2019; Solomon 2017). 
A sentiment of loss at the individual level is not merely provoked by alluding to the perception 
of being part of a socio-economic underclass, as conventional wisdom about the success of Vote 
Leave or the ascendancy of Donald Trump and the dominant ‘left behind thesis’ has suggested. 
Rather, it is through their emphasis on a national glorious past that populist humiliation 
narratives act as affective ‘temporal orientation devices’, which give sense to the present social 
disorder by providing an emotive blueprint of what the ‘true’ people have been through and 
establishing the need to put an end to suffering, weakness, and loss (Berenskoetter 2014: 270; 
Levinger 2017: 123). Inferiority and superiority thus co-exist to foster shared mental images of 





 ‘I’m with you – the American people. I am your voice.’ 
Donald Trump, 21 July 2016 
 
Through the ‘seductive rhythm of tragedy and triumph’ (reference blinded) humiliation 
narratives encourage a sense of group identity and in-group solidarity. The collective 
perception of humiliation provides a powerful psychological mechanism that functions as an 
affective ‘glue’ that binds together those who feel powerless, anxious, and betrayed (Ahmed 
2004; Berbrier 2000). As Koestenbaum (2011: 12) puts it, ‘If you humiliate me, I enter a new 
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community, a fellowship – across history – of sufferers and outcasts’. Through the fantasy of 
humiliation, populists appeal to a sense of collective narcissism in audiences who perceive the 
privileged status of their in-group identity as being denied by hostile out-groups (Golec de 
Zavala et al. 2019). 
Consider, for example, how Nigel Farage, then leader of the UK Independence Party, 
represented his followers as victims of elite contempt and placed himself among those 
humiliated. In his opening campaign speech for the 2015 UK general election, he explained 
that the establishment had shamefully treated its subjects as incapable of making mature 
choices through ‘building big government and nanny-state Britain, as if we’re not big enough’ 
(Farage 2015). But Farage claimed: ‘We will turn the other cheek, we will ignore their insults’ 
(ibid., emphasis added), signaling that he himself is not only one of the dishonored but is also 
on their side and is acting on their behalf (Haslam et al. 2010).  
During the 2016 US Presidential race, Republican candidate Donald Trump, articulated similar 
outrage when the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton characterized the backers 
of her opponent as racist, xenophobic, and sexist. Trump supporters were subsumed by Clinton 
under the disgracing label of ‘the basket of deplorables’, thereby rejecting their claims to 
righteousness and Americanness as well as their ‘very status to have made such a claim at all’ 
(Torres and Bergner 2010: 199). In response, throughout much of his September campaign 
events, Trump put the exoneration of his followers centerstage. His speech on 12 September 
2016 in Baltimore is a prime example. Here Trump declared that:  
‘Our support comes from every part of America, and every walk of life… These 
were the people Hillary Clinton so viciously demonized…. that Hillary Clinton 
called deplorable, irredeemable and un-American. She called these patriotic 
men and women every vile name in the book, [dividing them] into baskets as 
though they were objects, not human beings.’  
In this humiliation narrative, the Republican presidential candidate created a vivid image of 
his supporters as part of the common people, the ‘true’ people, who were unjustifiably and 
undeservedly demeaned by his opponent’s campaign. He asserted that Hillary Clinton was part 
of an arrogant liberal establishment that had nothing but scorn and disdain for ordinary 
American people. ‘She and her wealthy donors all had a good laugh’, explained Trump that 
day:  
‘They were laughing at the very people who pave the roads she drives on, paint 
the buildings she speaks in, and keep the lights on in her auditorium…. she 
mocks and demeans hardworking Americans… She revealed herself to be a 
person who looks down on the proud citizens of our country as subjects for her 
to rule over.’ 
The vernacular rhetoric of a shared humiliation signifies empathy for the conditions of 
insecurity that ‘ordinary’ people experience in their everyday lives, and it thereby goes beyond 
populist political agents’ claims to look and sound like the people they claim to represent. At 
the same time, a narrative emphasis on humiliation, linked to the promise of returning those 
who have been victimized to their righteous status, also allows populist political agents to form 
a positive and affirmative emotive connection with their audiences. Identification is entwined 
with feelings of attachment (Mercer 2014: 517), and a sense of shared humiliation forges an 
affective bond between the ‘forgotten people’, Les Oubliés, and the populist who shares in their 
pain and sense of grievance. Populist political agents echo the humiliating experience of their 
audiences in their self-styled role as leader of the resistance: they give voice to the ‘underdog ’ 
by supposedly ‘telling it as it is’.  
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The use of humiliation as an essential marker of identity is aimed at removing what is seen as 
a disturbance to the glorious collective self. Take, for instance, the 45th American President’s 
tendency to amplify ‘true’ Americans’ grievances amid the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests 
against structural racism, police brutality, and the public presence of Confederate symbols in 
the United States. Trump’s populist humiliation performance included falsely claiming during 
a CBS News interview on 17 July 2020 not only that white people where disproportionally likely 
to die at the hands of law enforcement but also that the protesters engaged in treasonous 
behavior. In Autumn 2020, speaking on Constitution Day from the National Archives in 
Washington DC, he shifted the blame for protests against police violence and racial injustice 
onto ‘decades of left-wing indoctrination in our schools’. Specifically, Trump derided the New 
York Times’ Pulitzer Prize-winning 1619 Project, which details US history from the first arrival 
of enslaved Africans on America’s shores, alongside Critical Race Theory more broadly, as 
being part of ‘a crusade against American history’. People on ‘the Left’, the President claimed, 
used the school curriculum to ‘bully Americans into abandoning their values, their heritage 
and their very way of life’. He made the starkly divisive announcement that he was signing an 
executive order to establish a ‘1776 Commission’ aimed at removing the ‘ideological poison’, 
‘toxic propaganda’, and ‘twisted web of lies’ of ‘radical’ history education on systemic racism in 
America, which he claimed as this was dissolving ‘the civic bonds that tie us together’. In its 
place he called for the establishment of a pro-American ‘patriotic education’ that ‘celebrates 
the truth about our nation’s great history’. In the same speech, in another nod to the myth of 
the Lost Cause, Trump promised to add a statue of Caesar Rodney, a slave owner who signed 
the Declaration of Independence, to the National Garden of American Heroes park that he 
proposed to create during a speech at Mount Rushmore on 4 July 2020. Trump stated:  
‘American parents are not going to accept indoctrination in our schools, cancel 
culture at work or the repression of traditional faith, culture and values in the 
public square… For many years now, the radicals have mistaken Americans’ 
silence for weakness. They’re wrong’. 
 
The populist humiliation fantasy of suffering and loss of control over life and livelihood here 
becomes integral to and constitutive of identity for those who belong, acting as an affective 
device of mobilization. Regardless of what insults are thrown at them, it signals that the true 
people hold together, loyal to where they come from, sharing experiences of pride in the face 
of betrayal and adversity. As one rural voter in the United States declared, a sense of shared 
humiliation and perception of disdain for their way of life from urban liberals, Black Lives 
Matter activists, and Democrats was a powerful motivator to vote for Trump in 2020 despite 
misgivings over his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic: ‘People felt slighted by them calling us 
racist hicks and talking about the backwards Midwest out in the sticks’ (McGreal 2020). 
Through humiliation, collective victimhood becomes agentic (Sasley 2020; Jacoby 2014). 
Research on ontological security in International Relations has already suggested that the drive 
for identity continuity leads to antagonistic foreign policies (Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008; 
Subotić 2016; cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017). As we explore below, populist humiliation 
narratives also foster conflictual behaviour, with the animus directed against a broad range of 
undeserving Others. Because humiliation takes place within a relationship where one party, 
who expects a higher status, perceives that they are lowered in status (Saurette 2005: 12), it 
leads to feelings of mourning the loss of status as well as rage and envy towards those who have 
blocked the ‘true’ people from regaining wholeness. It is important to note that a humiliating 
experience does not need to be linked to an actual loss of social or economic status to drive 
vertical blame attribution towards the nefarious elites and undeserving others who have put 
the ‘true’ and ‘innocent’ people in this position of loss and marginalization. Rather, it can work 
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as a powerful anticipated emotion, where the expectation of a potential future loss is brought 
forward to shape how people feel and act in the present (Barbalet and Demertzis, 2013; Miceli 
and Castelfranchi 2015; Neckel 1991). As Salmela and von Scheve (2017: 580, emphasis in 
original) put it, ‘threats of precarization or déclassement seem to be more important politically 
than actual déclassement’. 
 
 
TAKING BACK CONTROL 
 
As the fear of ‘them’ grows, ‘we’ come to represent everything virtuous. 
Stanley 2018: xvii 
     
How did the gloom and doom of the present come to replace a nation’s former glory, turning 
the ‘true’ people into voiceless ‘baskets of deplorables’? The answer given in this affective 
populist tale of humiliation is surprisingly straightforward: nefarious elites – from the 
Washington ‘swamp’ to British judges, Brussels ‘Eurocrats’, and Volksverräter Angela Merkel 
– as well as undeserving Others such as immigrants and ‘traitors’ are the main culprits behind 
the loss and active destruction of national greatness, dignity, and freedom. These ‘enemies of 
the people’ have rendered the country both weak and vulnerable to tyranny from within and 
without. It is a simplistic narrative of betrayal, defeat, and surrender in which fulfilling the ‘will 
of the people’ becomes a heroic struggle to ‘take back control’.  
The populist promise of a return to a better past creates an antagonistic tension between the 
humiliated in-group and the victimizing out-group (van Dijk 2006: 248-249), and draws a 
rhetorical frontier between ‘we, the people’ and their enemies at two distinct levels. Upwards, 
blame-attribution is directed against those in positions of power and privilege who have 
brought upon the weakness that the country and its true people experience in the present. This 
includes, domestically, the self-serving and detached ‘establishment’ and, internationally, the 
‘bad’ countries, institutions, and regulations that have – enabled by their corrupt national allies 
– pushed the country into economic and reputational decline. In populist humiliation 
narratives, enemies from within pave the way for external enemies to thrive and diminish the 
country’s standing and freedom.  
A case in point is the way in which Donald Trump consistently condemned foreign actors for 
what they do to us – for ‘killing us’, ‘beating us’, ‘laughing at us’, ‘taking our money’, ‘lending 
our money back to us’, and for ‘sending people to us’. In his 2016 address to accept the 
presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention on 21 July 2016, he 
underscored that ordinary Americans had ‘lived through one international humiliation after 
another. One after another’. A frequently used instance of international humiliation during the 
2016 US presidential election was the 12 January 2016 US-Iran naval incident, in which Iran’s 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps seized two US Navy ships after they had entered Iranian 
territorial waters. At a campaign rally in Ocala, Florida, on 12 October 2016 Trump explained 
to his captive audience that:  
‘You see the way they captured our ten sailors ’cause they were a little bit in the 
wrong waters. And instead of saying nicely, “Hey, listen. You gotta be over there a 
little bit”, they humiliated the sailors, humiliated their families, and humiliated our 
country’ (emphasis added). 
Yet much of the cultivation of a ‘stab in the back’ myth of national humiliation is directed 
against internal culprits. As Trump put it on 23 October 2016, during remarks aimed at his 
2016 Democratic opponent, ‘The Clintons end up with the money, and America ends up with 
 12 
the humiliation’. Public opinion polls of his voter base at the time found above average scores 
for both mistrust of the federal government and sentiments of anger (Oliver and Rahn 2016: 
200). Rather than primarily target foreign adversaries and strategic rivals, during his single 
term as US president, in over one-hundred tweets and retweets, Trump continued to deride 
US domestic opponents and key institutions of American liberal democracy as dishonest, 
selfish, and distant enemies of the American people.  
Following the Brexit referendum in the UK, the life-long Eurosceptic politician Nigel Farage 
also consistently invoked the rhetoric of establishment betrayal, accusing the mainstream 
Conservative and Labour parties of attempting to subvert the ‘true’ people’s will and sabotaging 
Britain’s exit from the tyranny of the European Union. He went as far as conjuring up the image 
of armed resistance against foreign enemies in war, declaring that if Brexit was not delivered 
‘then I will be forced to don khaki, pick up a rifle and head for the front lines’ (quoted in Peck 
2017). The statement, extensively criticized for inciting violence, took place in the broader 
context of widespread attempts to daunt those delaying the UK’s departure from the European 
Union. On 4 November 2016, for example, The Daily Mail featured the frontpage headline 
‘Enemies of the People’ underneath the pictures of three high court judges. Widely seen as a 
deliberate attempt to intimidate those seeking to uphold the rule of law, extremist Brexit 
supporters used the headline to call, across social media platforms, for beheading what they 
saw as treasonous judges. The display of outrage over ‘out of touch’ judges who ‘declared war 
on democracy’ followed the murder of the British Labour Party MP Jo Cox five months earlier, 
with the accused murderer provocatively replying ‘death to traitors, Freedom to Britain’ when 
asked to state his name in court.  
In the UK, mobilizing individuals into active defenders of their rightful place in society through 
a humiliation-centric Brexit framing that relies upon depredations of elite others continued 
beyond the formal triggering of Article 50 to begin the process of exiting the European Union. 
For example, on 30 March 2019 two rallies took place a few hundred metres apart in 
Westminster to protest the UK’s delayed exit from the European Union. The Leave Means 
Leave rally at Parliament Square and the far-right Make Brexit Happen event at Whitehall 
took place amidst chants of ‘out means out’ andshouts of ‘treason’ and ‘traitors’ directed at 
those seen as disavowing the will of the people. Rally attendees soon turned sentiments of 
humiliation and betrayal into anger, shifting vocal discontent over the abstract experience of 
narcissistic injury into a direct physical abreaction that targeted Members of Parliament and 
journalists in an expression of narcissistic rage.  
In populist humiliation discourse, the exclusive community of the true people who share a 
common origin and destiny are not only separate from the nefarious elites ‘above’ but also from 
those unwanted Others ‘below’. The second category of blame-attribution is rhetorically 
focused explicitly on those located outside positions of power, with a particular emphasis on 
the downward mobilization of anger towards Otherness.  A key discursive focus is on 
newcomers to the country, who Trump framed as criminals, rapists, killers, snakes, and 
terrorists, while Boris Johnson has engaged in deriding jibes about people of colour. The 
populist emphasis on dehumanizing immigrants who take our jobs, our housing, and our 
health care while posing a security risk to our women and children has been widely discussed. 
That the devaluing framing of migrant Others gains traction may be linked less to prior-held 
outright xenophobia in target audiences that populist political agents speak to and give voice 
to. Rather, this should be understood as a reaction to a perception of self-devaluation that is 
both linked to and stoked by populist humiliation narratives, where undeserving Others are 
seen to receive preferential treatment to the true people (see e.g. Hillije 2018: 10).  
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Within the context of both the Brexit referendum in the UK and the Black Lives Matter protests 
in the US, a second rift between those who belong and those who do not has been opened 
widely in recent populist humiliation discourse. Focused on ‘good’ people and ‘bad’ people, this 
goes beyond the rhetoric that chastises immigrant Others. In the UK, those who voted to stay 
within the European Union are ridiculed as ‘Remoaners’, while in the US those who hold anti-
racist positions are derided as criminals. Taking the knee at the singing of the national anthem 
as many, predominantly African-American players in the National Football League had 
adopted as a sign of silent protest was, for Trump, an insufferable affront against the honor of 
the nation. Speaking of the Black Lives Matter protestors as ‘Antifa’ at a Press Gaggle on 18 
September 2020, Trump asserted that ‘these are thugs. These are bad people. These are people 
that hurt … a lot of good people’. His supporters, in turn, patrolled streets in Southern US cities 
such as Louisville, Kentucky, as self-described ‘patriots’ – dressed in combat gear, armed with 
guns and rifles, and with American flags in hand.  
Blame-shifting strategies of hate and racism are certainly not unique to populist rhetoric. Yet 
the above discussion serves to illustrate that populist humiliation discourse relies upon such 
messaging, directed in particular at white (male) audiences, to give sense to vague feelings of 
loss and marginalization and to show a way out, fueling feelings of empowerment that are 
directly linked to a desire for revenge and to inflict harm rather than a sense of defeatism, 
inertia, or passivity. Trump’s call, during the presidential debate on 29 September 2020, for 
the neo-fascist and white supremacist ‘Proud Boys’ to ‘stand back and stand ready’ was widely 
interpreted as thinly-veiled encouragement of violence by those identifying with a narrative of 
white victimhood. The desperate yearning to reestablish pride and honour through warding off 
humiliation is accompanied ‘by assaulting and injuring others and thus transferring one’s own 
shame and dishonor onto them’ (Gilligan 2017: 175). As Harkavy (2000: 350) put it:  
“on the left side of this equation, so to speak, are humiliation, shame, defeat, and 
loss. On the other side of the equation are revenge and vengeance, plus retaliation, 
payback, “tit for tat” and, perhaps, revisionism and irredentism. These are no mere 
quibbles.”  
The political significance of shared humiliation as a narrative device, then, is that inward 
feelings of shame, provoked through the demeaning experience, are directed outward, away 
from the individual and collective weakened self via blame-attribution (Hejdenberg and 
Andrews 2011: 1278). Indeed, when vulnerable, weak, despised, and helpless parts of the Self 
are projected upon the external, ideologically distorted member of the outgroup, this fosters 
both aggression and violence (Bohleber 2003). From a psychological perspective, such cruelty 
directed at members of the outgroup will not come as a surprise. Individuals who experience 
anger in the form of narcissistic rage after encountering humiliation tend to ‘show total lack of 
empathy towards the defender’ (Kohut 1972: 386). Not only does humiliation have a strong 
emotive pull, but collaboration, dialogue, and peaceful conflict resolution are difficult, if not 
impossible, courses of action for those experiencing a strong sense of humiliation combined 
with narcissistic injury.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom tells us that the rise in populism today is linked to a crisis of liberal 
democracy. While the language of populism is increasingly used as a weapon to discredit 
political opponents, in this article we explored how populist political agents rely upon 
humiliation-centric discursive frames to transpose abstract concerns about enmity and threat 
into everyday perceptions of insecurity. They do so by appealing to complex and ambiguous 
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emotions, both positive and negative, to create and and channel individual and collective 
energies around social divisions.  
Our narrative inquiry suggests that populist political agents from the right of the political 
spectrum are complicit in creating the very sense of existential crisis in the everyday that they 
promise to tackle. Populist political agents may act as challengers to ‘business as usual’ (Laclau 
2005: 123). Yet it is their use of humiliation narratives that helps to widen the limits of 
possibility through an emotive shift away from ‘rational’ political action towards an emotive 
politics of outrage, which underwrites a radical departure from established policy norms and 
electoral preferences. As this article suggests, rather than identifying humiliation with a sense 
of weakness and passivity, fantasies of shared humiliation are a powerful narrative tool in the 
hands of populist identity entrepreneurs to manipulate public sentiments for political gain. 
Reversing the roles of humiliator and victim, they enable the forging of an affective bond of 
positive affirmation with their audiences through invoking a shared reality of pain and 
suffering, experienced at the hands of domestic and foreign ‘enemies of the people’, while 
translating this emotive repertoire into calls for systemic change and radical exclusion of 
unwanted Others.  
Populist humiliation narratives construct a security imaginary around the perceived loss of 
past national greatness, domestically and internationally, which creates affinities with the 
experiences of those who feel disempowered, and which ties existential anxieties to concerns 
with immigration, globalization, and integration. They tap into everyday emotive resources 
linked to a sense of persecution and victimhood to make distant and abstract political positions 
‘feelable’. As this article has shown, populist humiliation discourse achieves this via three 
interdependent mechanisms that together give sense to what appears as conflicting narratives 
of greatness and victimhood: (1) creating a mythical past as glorious and victorious through 
the reinterpretation of selected traumas and triumphs; (2) establishing that this past has been 
lost and that this loss is a humiliating experience; and (3) generating a sense of shared 
humiliation as an action-inducing and identity-affirming abreaction that is directed toward a 
desire to inflict harm on others.  
Within a humiliation-centric discourse sentiments of sameness and togetherness are 
intertwined with narcissistic injury, turning perceptions of loss and defeat into shared 
prejudice that is directed against those who are seen as not belonging to the ‘true’ people. 
Populist humiliation narratives create a simultaneous need for allyship and enmity. The 
humiliation-centric discursive construction of belonging and exclusion, superiority and 
inferiority, establishes an emotive connection between populist political agents and their 
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